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Abstract 
Using a two-sector-two-country model with aggregate scale economies and unionisation, we 
show that optimal welfare state policy entails positive levels of unemployment benefits under 
free-trade and capital mobility.  In this setting, economic integration does not reduce the 
revenue raising capacity of governments and thus does not lead to a race-to-the-bottom in 
social standards.  Instead, trade and capital flows interact with welfare state policies in 
increasing welfare even when each government acts independently (non-cooperatively) in 
determining its optimal welfare payment.  Cooperation is shown to improve upon non-
cooperative outcomes by raising both the generosity of the welfare state and aggregate 
welfare.   
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
Large-scale public provision of social insurance and progressive systems of redistributive 
taxation are increasingly perceived as being incompatible with economic globalisation.  Two 
main arguments define the emerging conventional wisdom.  First, in an environment 
characterised by deep trade integration, the distortionary effects of welfare state policies and 
the taxation necessary to finance them are thought to adversely affect a country’s economic 
performance vis-à-vis its competitors.1  Second, the credible threat of exit of increasingly 
mobile capital and firms allegedly leads to a shrinking of the tax base and to pressures to shift 
the burden of taxation on to less mobile factors such as labour.  As a result, globalisation 
purportedly reduces governments’ ability to finance social policies by weakening their 
control over both the volume and structure of tax revenue, thus entailing a danger of a ‘race-
to-the-bottom’ in social and labour standards as countries compete with each other to attract 
and/or retain industry.  
 In general, however, there does not seem to be compelling evidence that the increased 
extent of goods and capital market integration during the last decades has contributed 
systematically to the retrenchment of mature welfare states and/or to a substantial reduction 
of overall tax burdens2, and some recent empirical studies find a positive relationship 
between openness and the size of the welfare state (e.g., Rodrik, 1998).  Nevertheless, the 
arguments at the core of the conventional wisdom are not fundamentally disputed even by 
more complex analyses of the relationship between globalisation and the welfare state such 
as, for example, the ‘compensation hypothesis’ (Garrett, 1998; Garrett and Mitchell, 1999; 
Rodrik, 1997, 1998).3  
 In this paper we contend that circumstances can exist in which welfare states and high 
degrees of economic integration are perfectly compatible, and argue that the roots of these 
circumstances lie in the imperfectly competitive nature of goods and factor markets.  Our 
argument relies on the well-known principle that in a second-best world – which is, after all, 
                                                 
1    This is the ‘distortionary argument’ for welfare state retrenchment in a global economy as developed, for 
instance, in Alesina and Perotti (1997). 
2   Although labour income taxes as a proportion of government revenue have grown faster than capital taxation 
(which has tended to fall after the mid-1990s), overall tax burdens in advanced industrial economies have not 
significantly reduced. Moreover, despite wide cross-country diversity in spending levels, social expenditure 
in OECD countries (except Norway) has increased up until the mid-1990s; in the European Union, 
subsequent reforms have generally been limited to a restructuring of expenditure with modest declines in 
some areas and stability or even a slow growth in others (for evidence see: European Commission, 2002; 
Garrett and Mitchell, 2001; Bretschger and Hettich, 2002). 
3   This hypothesis explains the continued expansion of the welfare state as a response to the rising demands for 
social insurance resulting from the increasing exposure to external risk and economic dislocations caused by 
growing international openness.   
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at the very core of the rationale behind the existence of the welfare state – economic policy 
can be welfare improving. This principle has been addressed at both the microeconomic and 
macroeconomic levels.   
 At the microeconomic level, within market structures which enable producers to set 
their price above marginal cost, the level of provision of a differentiated good (determined by 
the equilibrium number of firms resulting from free entry and exit) has been shown to be sub-
optimal.  This is because the marginal utility of consumption will, in such equilibrium, 
exceed the marginal cost of production.  A social planner who maximises consumer surplus 
subject to the zero profit condition can, in such circumstances, use distortion-free lump-sum 
transfers from consumers to producers to subsidise a welfare-improving entry, hence raising 
the provision of varieties.4      
 This type of policy effectiveness in the face of market imperfections has also emerged 
in studies of sub-optimal general macroeconomic equilibrium.  A seminal paper by Hart 
(1982) shows that in the presence of imperfect competition in both goods and labour markets, 
the equilibrium level of activity will be too low and there will be unemployment.  In this 
context, a simple balanced budget fiscal intervention will have desirable typical Keynesian 
effects.  Building on Hart’s work, a succession of studies − notably Blanchard and Kiyotaki 
(1987), Mankiw (1988) and Startz (1989) − have strengthened the proposition that some 
exogenous stimulation of demand, either through fiscal expansion or via income 
redistribution, can be welfare improving when there are some market imperfections in the 
economy.  In the case of imperfectly competitive goods markets, while the marginal benefit 
of consumption exceeds the marginal cost of production, individual consumers per se will not 
(due to a free riding incentive) take any initiative to improve upon this sub-optimal situation 
by raising their expenditure autonomously.  This reluctance by private agents then gives a 
strong incentive for a (redistributive or expansionary) fiscal intervention by the government.   
 The policy effectiveness channel in our analysis is, in spirit, similar to that outlined 
above, but is also reinforced by the existence of aggregate economies of scale stemming from 
vertical linkages between sectors.5  We embed these features within a standard two-county 
model with trade and capital mobility. Each country is characterised by: (i) vertical linkages 
between two production sectors that are populated by endogenously determined masses of 
                                                 
4    See Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).   Anderson et al. (1992) explain the origins of this result in Chamberlin’s work 
on the trade off between production efficiency and benefits of diversity.   
5   Inter-industry connections are an important source of external returns to scale in manufacturing − see 
Bartelsman, et al.  (1994) for evidence − and they have been extensively acknowledged by the theoretical 
literature, e.g.  Ethier (1982), Matsuyama (1995) and Venables (1996).   
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monopolistically competitive firms; (ii) a unionised labour market; and (iii) a welfare state 
policy in the form of unemployment benefits financed via proportional factor income 
taxation.  The intersectoral linkages give rise to aggregate scale economies, with productivity 
in the downstream sector increasing in the mass of varieties produced in the upstream sector.  
In this context, an expansionary welfare state policy contributes to the correction of the sub-
optimal production of intermediate varieties, thus leading to an increase in aggregate 
efficiency.   
 We obtain the optimal unemployment benefit rate for different degrees of economic 
integration under non-cooperative and cooperative policy regimes.  We find that the welfare 
state complements, rather than conflicts with, globalisation forces in improving economic 
performance and raising welfare.6  In particular, (i) the optimal policy entails a positive 
unemployment benefit rate in all regimes; (ii) the optimal unemployment benefit rate 
(together with employment and welfare) increases with economic integration; and (iii) the 
cooperative solution entails higher unemployment benefits (and higher employment and 
welfare) than the non-cooperative solutions.  Thus, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the 
opening up to trade and capital mobility and competition between governments do not lead to 
a race-to-the-bottom in social policies and to the ultimate disappearance of the welfare state.  
The basic mechanism at the core of these results can be explained as follows.  The increase in 
the demand for final goods, which is triggered by the immediate expansionary impact of the 
welfare policy, induces a deepening of the division of labour in the intermediate sector.  The 
latter leads to a rise in aggregate efficiency, real income and welfare.  The strength of this 
cumulative process is positively related to the extent of vertical linkages between sectors. 7   
 The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 outlines the model and 
derives the optimal policy under autarky.  Section 3 extends the autarky results to the two-
country case, derives the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium solutions under free-trade 
without and with capital mobility, and compares them to that obtained under full cooperation.  
Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6   These results go against those of Alesina and Perotti (1997), but are consistent with the positive empirical 
relationship between social spending and competitiveness found by De Grauwe and Polan (2003).    
7   Alternative mechanisms are examined by van der Ploeg (2003) who shows that conditional unemployment 
benefits may spur job creation, and by Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) who find that unemployment insurance 
can improve allocative efficiency by enabling workers to pursue riskier and more productive options. 
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2.   THE MODEL: AUTARKY 
There are two monopolistically competitive sectors (x and y) in the economy, each supplying 
horizontally differentiated goods with internal increasing returns to scale.  Sector y produces 
only a final consumption good, while the output of sector x is used both as an intermediate 
input in sector y and as a final consumption good by consumers.  The vertical linkages 
between the two sectors give rise to aggregate scale economies.  The deep division of labour 
and the complex inter-industry linkages typical of industrial economies are known to result in 
high degrees of specialisation and, to some extent, in some sector specificity of factors of 
production.8  We therefore assume that labour is used directly only in sector x, while sector y 
employs it only indirectly via the use of intermediates as inputs.9 We also assume that the 
labour market is unionised.  Consistent with the observed tendency in European labour 
markets towards segmentation in union coverage and decentralisation in collective bargaining 
(Boeri et al, 2001), we assume that wages are set by decentralised (firm-level) monopoly 
unions.  The government, whose role in the economy is limited to income redistribution, is a 
provider of welfare protection in the form of unemployment benefits financed via 
proportional factor income taxation.  The real unemployment benefits payment is chosen 
optimally by the government before the other agents in the economy (consumers, unions and 
firms) optimise their objective functions taking the fiscal policy instruments (tax and 
unemployment benefit rates) as given.10   
2.1. Final consumers  
The preferences of the representative consumer are characterised by the utility function 
 
1
(1 )
1
c cX YU V
µ µ
ξµ µ
−⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
? , (1) 
where 0<µ <1, Xc and Yc are the consumption of the goods produced by sectors x and y 
respectively, and V~  is the utility of leisure.  The individual is endowed with one unit of 
labour and supplies it inelastically in the labour market; 1=ξ  if the individual is employed 
and 0=ξ  otherwise.  Following Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), we assume that higher 
aggregate unemployment “makes it more painful to be unemployed” and thus reduces the 
                                                 
8    Whilst technological advances in the early phases of industrialisation led to an increase in intersectoral labour 
mobility, starting from the 1920s the growing complementarity between skills and technology generally led 
to an increase in sector specificity of labour (Hiscox, 2002).    
9   Relaxing this assumption would not alter the qualitative nature of the results of the paper. 
10  Given that, as we shall see, all agents in the economy are insignificantly small individually to interact 
strategically, no strategic complication arises in terms of the sequence of the moves.   
 5
utility of leisure. Hence, we let )(~ ufV =  where u denotes the rate of unemployment in the 
economy, with 0)0( >f  and 0f ′ < .  Clearly, )1()0( ff −  ought to be sufficiently large so as 
to yield a plausible equilibrium solution for u within the positive unit interval.  More 
specifically, we shall use 1V eη= −?? , where 1 u= −?  is the aggregate employment rate and η 
is a positive parameter.  
 Optimisation of (1) subject to the budget constraint yields the demand functions  
 c
x
MX
P
µ= , (2) 
 (1 )c
y
MY
P
µ= − , (3) 
where xP  and yP  are the prices of the two goods and M  is nominal disposable income to be 
defined later.    
 We assume that both differentiated goods are aggregated into CES baskets given by  
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where xi (yi) is the quantity of a typical variety of the good, Nx (Ny) is the mass of available 
varieties and σ >1 (δ >1) is the elasticity of substitution between varieties produced in sector 
x (y).  The industry price indices dual to (4) and (5) are, respectively,   
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⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ ,                     (7) 
where 
ix
p  (
jy
p ) is the price of a typical variety produced in sector x (y).   
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2.2. Producers  
There are two sector specific primary inputs in the economy: labour (L) and capital (K).  
These are respectively used in sector x and sector y and have rates of return denoted by w and 
r.  
 Each sector is populated by a mass of identical firms, each firm producing a variety of 
the horizontally differentiated product according to an increasing returns to scale technology.  
Sector x uses labour as both fixed and variable input.  The total labour demand of a typical 
firm in this sector is i il xα β= +  where ix  is the firm’s output and il  is its labour 
requirement; α>0 and β>0 are constant parameters which are assumed to be the same across 
firms and respectively measure the inverse of labour productivity and fixed input 
requirement.  In sector y, each firm uses a  fixed input requirement φ of capital and, as 
variable input, a composite basket of the intermediate varieties produced in sector x 
assembled according to the CES aggregator in (4).  For any given mass of intermediate 
varieties, the variable input requirement of a typical firm in sector y exhibits constant returns 
to scale j jX yλ= .  λ>0 is a constant parameter and its inverse measures the degree of 
vertical linkages between the two sectors.  Thus, labour is not used directly in sector y but is 
embodied in X.  Also, the CES nature of the latter implies that there are increasing returns to 
the range of available varieties, since the productivity of the intermediate basket in sector y is 
increasing in the mass of varieties in sector x.     
 The profit function of a typical firm in sectors x and y is, respectively,     
 ( )
i ix x i i i
p x w xπ α β= − + ,   (8) 
 ( )
j jy y j x j
p y P y rπ λ φ= − + .   (9) 
2.3.   Factor markets 
The market for capital is perfectly competitive with r adjusting to satisfy the resource 
constraint  
  yN Kφ = , (10) 
where K  is the economy’s endowment of capital.   
 The labour market is unionised.  While wages are set by decentralised firm-level 
monopoly unions, employment is determined by firms.  Given the symmetry between firms, 
in sector x there is a mass Nx of identical unions.  Denoting by L  the aggregate labour force, 
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a typical union i will have a mass of members il  and will embrace the workers of, and set the 
wage rate for, firm i in sector x.  Unionisation implies that involuntary unemployment persists 
in equilibrium and that each union will have some unemployed members11 – i.e., i il l<  
where il  is the union’s employed members.  Each union maximises the expected real income 
of its typical member subject to its labour demand.  Hence, union i’s objective function is  
 (1 )i i i ii
i i
l t w l lU b
l P l
− −= + , (11) 
where  
 µµ −= 1yx PPP   (12) 
is the consumer price index, t is the labour income tax rate and b is the real lump-sum benefit 
received by an unemployed worker.  We assume that unemployment benefit payments are not 
taxed, i.e., they are net transfers.   
2.4. Government budget constraint and aggregate income 
The government, whose role in the economy is limited to income redistribution, is a provider 
of welfare protection in the form of unemployment benefits financed via proportional factor 
income taxation.  Noting that 
x x
i i
i N i N
l di L L l di
∈ ∈
= ≥ =∫ ∫ , the government budget constraint is 
given by   
 ( )
x x
i i i i
i N i N
Pb l l di t w l di q rK
∈ ∈
− = +∫ ∫ .  (13)  
 
The right-hand-side of equation (13) is the total tax revenue extracted from the primary 
factors, where q is the capital income tax rate, and the left-hand-side of the equation gives the 
total unemployment benefit bill.   
 Aggregate income of consumers, M, is determined by total disposable incomes of 
primary factors and the transfers from the public to private sector 
 
 (1 ) ( ) (1 )
x
i i i i
i N
M t w l Pb l l di q rK
∈
⎡ ⎤= − + − + −⎣ ⎦∫ .   (14) 
                                                 
11  We follow the literature in assuming that unemployed workers from other unions cannot be employed in a 
given union’s firm before the latter’s unemployed members are hired.   
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2.5.   General Equilibrium 
Given the assumed preferences and technologies, the total expenditure on the varieties of the 
good produced in sector x is given by x y xE M N P yµ λ= + , where the two terms on the right-
hand-side are the total expenditures by the country’s consumers and by firms in sector y, 
respectively.  The total expenditure on the varieties of the good produced in sector y is 
instead given by (1 )yE Mµ= − .  Using these, the demand functions for the variety facing a 
typical firm in sectors x and y are, respectively  
 ixxi
x x
pEx
P P
σ−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, (15) 
 jyyj
y y
pE
y
P P
δ−⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
.   (16) 
Firms in both sectors set their prices by maximising their profits − given by (8) and (9) − 
subject to their demand − in (15) and (16) − and taking the total expenditures and input prices 
as given.  The first order condition for this maximisation can be used to obtain the firms’ 
optimal price rules in sectors x and y respectively  
 
1ix i
p wασσ= − ,  (17) 
 
1jy x
p Pλδδ= − . (18) 
For simplicity, we will use the normalisation ( )1 /α σ σ= −  and replace (17) with 
ix i
p w= .  
We shall, however, keep (18) intact in order to examine the effect of a rise in the extent of 
vertical integration captured by a reduction in λ.   
 The mass of firms in each sector is endogenously determined via free entry and exit 
and the market clearing process.  Hence, at the free-entry equilibrium, all firms in both 
sectors will break even.  Substituting (17) and (18) into (8) and (9) respectively and setting 
the resulting equations equal to zero, we obtain the equilibrium output scale of a typical firm 
in sector x and y 
 ix βσ= ,  (19)  
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 ( )1j
x
ry
P
φ δ
λ
− ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
.   (20) 
Hence, in the symmetric equilibrium, while in sector x the optimal output scale of firms is 
constant, in sector y the vertical linkages imply that it depends on the relative price of the two 
inputs used in the sector.  In particular, ceteris paribus, the equilibrium output scale in sector 
y increases with the depth of the division of labour in sector x (i.e., it is increasing in xN  
through its effect on xP ).  Moreover, this effect is larger the larger is the degree of 
intersectoral linkages (1/λ).   
 The wage rate paid by each firm in sector x is determined by the monopoly union 
covering its workers.  A typical union takes P, b and t as given and chooses its wage rate iw  
to maximise its objective function in (11) subject to the firm’s labour demand (i.e., 
i il xα β= + ) as well as (15) and (17).  The wage setting equation resulting from this 
optimisation is  
 
( ) 11 1
i
i
w b
P
t ε
= ⎛ ⎞− −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, (21) 
where iε  denotes the wage elasticity of labour demand facing the union and is an inverse 
measure of unions’ monopoly power.  It is straightforward to show that 1iε σ= − .  
 The optimal (real) wage set by the union is positively related to both labour income 
tax rate and real unemployment benefit since: (i) a ceteris paribus increase in t reduces the 
after tax wage; and (ii) a higher unemployment benefit rate b reduces the utility difference 
between being employed and unemployed. The wage rate is also negatively related to ε since 
an increase in the latter reduces the rent extracting ability of the union.      
 Given the assumed symmetry between firms in each sector, we drop the subscripts i 
and j from the equations and, adopting good Y as numeraire, we set 1yP = .   
 For any given values of the policy instruments, t, q and b, a general equilibrium is 
attained when all private agents optimise their objective functions and goods and capital 
markets clear.  In addition, since the general equilibrium also requires the government budget 
constraint to hold, one of the policy instruments will have to be left to adjust in order to 
ensure that the tax revenue equals the unemployment benefit bill.  For simplicity, we shall 
assume in the rest of the analysis that the government sets identical tax rates for the income 
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of the two primary inputs and let q=t.  The solution of the model will therefore determine the 
endogenous variables − i.e. Nx, Ny, x, y, px, py, Px, P, r, w, L, M, Ex, Ey  − and the policy 
instrument that is left to vary to balance the budget – i.e. either t or b.   
 
2.6.  Optimal unemployment benefit and the role of vertical linkages  
The government maximises aggregate welfare to determine the optimal unemployment 
benefit rate b allowing the tax rate t to adjust so as to balance its budget. The government’s 
objective function is given by the aggregate indirect utility which can be obtained from (1), 
i.e.,   
 ( )MU V L LP= + −? . (22) 
where 1
L
LV e
η ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= −? .  The function in (22) is maximised subject to the government budget 
constraints and all other equations determining Nx, Ny, x, y, px, py, Px, P, r, w, L, M, Ex, Ey and 
t in terms of b.  This is equivalent to first solving the model and determining these variables 
in terms of b and then substituting the resulting expressions in (22) to obtain the welfare 
function as ( )U b .  Given the analytical complexity of the model, we resort to numerical 
simulations.  Figure 1 below plots the aggregate welfare function and the function 
determining the aggregate employment rate, ( )U b  and / ( )L L b= ? , for two different values 
of the vertical linkages parameter λ.  As the figure suggests, aggregate employment is 
positively related to the real unemployment benefit rate and the optimal policy entails a 
positive b.  Recalling that λ is an inverse measure of the degree of vertical linkages between 
sectors, it is also clear that the optimal unemployment benefit rate and the associated level of 
aggregate employment and welfare are higher the stronger are the intersectoral linkages.   
 The concavity of ( )U b  reflects the trade-off that the government faces as a result of 
an increase in unemployment benefit.  This trade-off rests on the fact that, a rise in b leads to 
an increases in aggregate employment and in real income.  On the one hand, the higher 
income generates an incentive to raise b. On the other hand, the higher employment reduces 
the utility of leisure, hence making a lower unemployment benefit rate more desirable.   
 The fact that real income and employment are increasing in b may seem 
counterintuitive and is at odds with the conventional wisdom.  Central to this outcome is the 
existence of complementarities – stemming from monopolistic competition and intersectoral 
linkages − which result in a sub-optimal provision of intermediate varieties.  
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Figure 1. Equilibrium in the Autarky Case (1) 
Optimal Unemployment Benefit and the Role of Vertical Integration  
 
  
 
 
(1)   Parameter values used in the numerical simulation are given in the note to Table A3 in the 
Appendix. A reduction in λ is equivalent to a rise in the productivity of X and hence to a higher 
degree of vertical integration. 
(2) ( )U b  is aggregate welfare, measured here by the aggregate indirect utility, evaluated at the general 
equilibrium solution.  The plot of U depicts per capita welfare (i.e. as ratio of L ) scaled by 0.1 to 
enable comparison with /L L=? . 
 
The expansionary nature of the welfare policy reduces the extent of this sub-optimality.  To 
see the intuition behind this, let us sketch the complex adjustment process that follows an 
Unemployment Benefit, b 
( ); 1U b λ =  (2) 
( ); 1b λ =?  
W
elfare  and  Em
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W
elfare  and  Em
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( ); 0.95U b λ =  (2) 
( ); 0.95b λ =?  
Unemployment Benefit, b 
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exogenous change in b.  For any given Nx (the mass of firms in sector x), an increase in b will 
initially prompt unions to demand higher nominal wages. This will have two main effects.  
First, as firms in sector x mark-up their prices, the increase in wages is transferred into a 
higher price for each variety and thus leads to an increase in Px  –  the price index in the 
industry.   By triggering a substitution of Y for X by consumers and a reduction in demand for 
intermediates by firms in sector y, this effect will lower the demand for X – which, due to the 
vertical linkages, is however partially dampened by the higher demand for Y by consumers.  
Second, the increase in the benefit rate and the subsequent rise in the wage rate lead together 
to a higher aggregate nominal income that stimulates consumers’ demand for both X and Y.  
Note that, via the vertical linkages in production, the higher consumption of Y enhances the 
direct increase in the demand for X.   It is straightforward to show that the immediate impact 
of a rise in b (i.e., before the mass of firms, employment levels and other prices adjust) is a 
net increase in the demand for good X that triggers new entry of firms into sector x.   The 
expansion of Nx reduces Px which, other things equal, stimulates both final and intermediate 
demand for good X and thus leads to further entry into the sector. A rise in unemployment 
benefit, therefore, ultimately generates a positive pecuniary externality via an overall 
expansion of product variety in sector x which, by reducing Px, will lead to: (i) a higher 
productivity of the intermediate goods that will reduce the cost of production in sector y; (ii) a 
lower consumer price index that will foster the demand for final goods via a real income 
effect; and (iii) a substitution of X for Y by consumers that will further stimulate the demand 
for X.    The combined effects of these forces will give rise to a cumulative process of entry 
of new firms into the intermediate industry, higher aggregate efficiency12, employment and 
real income.  This virtuous circle clearly generates an incentive for the government to 
increase its unemployment benefit.  In doing so, however, it faces a trade-off in that the 
higher employment reduces the aggregate utility of leisure.   
 It is straightforward to verify that the virtuous circle discussed above is stronger the 
higher is the extent of intersectoral linkages, i.e., the stronger are the aggregate returns to 
scale.  In fact, the smaller is λ, the greater will be: (i) the increase in the demand for 
intermediates following the rise in final goods demand; (ii) the entry of new firms in sector x; 
(iii) the ensuing aggregate productivity gains; and (iv) the increase in employment and real 
income.  Hence, as is illustrated in Figure 1 above and in Table A3 in the Appendix, the 
                                                 
12   In De Grauwe and Polan (2003), social expenditure affects workers’ productivity by entering directly as an 
argument in the production function of the private sector. Here, instead, the effects of government policy on 
aggregate efficiency emerges endogenously. 
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optimal unemployment benefit rate is higher and the tax rate on primary factors’ incomes is 
lower (due to a higher tax base) at smaller values of λ.  Note also that, despite the higher 
employment, the overall size of the welfare state (i.e., the total unemployment benefit bill) is 
larger at smaller values of λ, i.e., the increase in b dominates the fall in unemployment. 
 
3.  INTERNATIONAL OPENNESS  
The aim of this section is to shed light on the effects of international economic integration on 
the optimal unemployment benefit policy described above.  To this end, we extend the model 
to a standard symmetric two-country setting.  We assume that the two economies (Home and 
Foreign, denoted by H and F respectively) are identical in every respect (tastes, technologies, 
institutional features and factor endowments).  Hence, the model developed in Section 2 
applies symmetrically to the foreign country – whose variables will be denoted with an 
asterisk superscript.  The equations for the two country model are given in Tables A1 and A2 
in the Appendix.  
 To start with, we shall focus on the effects of free-trade in goods and assume that both 
primary factors of production are internationally immobile.  Given the absence of trade 
barriers, the CES aggregators and the price indices of the two differentiated goods will be 
defined over the varieties produced in, and will be common to, both countries.  It follows that 
a major implication of free-trade is that the increasing returns to the range of available 
varieties of input X are fully ‘international’, i.e., the external economies of scale that 
characterise the economy are not country specific.  Thus, productivity in sector y in both 
countries is increasing in ( )*x xN N+ , where *xN  is the mass of varieties of good X produced 
in the foreign country.   
 
3.1.   Optimal non-cooperative policy under free-trade and no capital mobility  
We model the optimal non-cooperative policy as the outcome of a Nash game between 
governments. Hence, each government chooses its unemployment benefit rate to maximise 
the aggregate welfare of their residents given by (22), allowing the income tax rate to adjust 
to balance its budget and taking the unemployment benefit rate set by the other government 
as given.  Clearly, as in the autarky case, the maximisation of (22) is carried out subject to the 
governments’ budget constraints and all other equations determining the endogenous 
variables for H and F in terms of b and *b .  
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  The Nash equilibrium is depicted in Figure 2 below by the intersection of the two 
governments’ reaction functions and consists of positive and – given that the two countries 
are identical in every respect – symmetric unemployment benefit rates.  The fact that the two 
reaction functions are upward sloping reflects the positive spill-over effects that an increase 
in unemployment benefit in one country has on the other country’s welfare.  A unilateral 
increase in unemployment benefit in one country leads to an increase in the mass of 
intermediate varieties produced there and thus to a higher aggregate efficiency.  However, 
given that – due to the free tradability of the good – the returns to scale are fully international, 
the expansion in the intermediate product range in one country generates a positive pecuniary 
externality for its trading partner who will enjoy higher real income and whose government, 
as a result, will find it optimal to raise its unemployment benefit rate too.   
Figure 2. Non-Cooperative Nash Equilibrium in the Two-Country Case (1) 
Reaction Functions with Free-trade and No Capital Mobility 
 
 
(1)  Parameter values used in the numerical simulation are given in the note to Table A3 in the 
Appendix.  
(2)  The broken lines show the shift in the reaction functions as a result of an increase in the degree of 
vertical integration. See the relevant column in Table A3 in the Appendix for the effect of a rise in 
the extent of vertical integration captured by a reduction in λ. 
45o 
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 As is clear from Table A3 in the Appendix, the Nash equilibrium unemployment 
benefit rates are higher than in the autarkic regime.  Furthermore, the tax rate is lower and 
employment, real income, and aggregate welfare are higher.  Hence, due to positive inter-
country spillovers that result from free-trade, a departure from autarky makes it optimal for 
governments to increase the generosity and the real size of their welfare state, ( )b L L− , 
despite the lower tax rates and the lower unemployment.  Essentially, the positive efficiency 
effects of international trade reinforce, and are reinforced by, the efficiency gains due to 
aggregate increasing returns that are triggered by the policy. 
 Again, as in the autarkic case, when intersectoral linkages are stronger, the Nash 
equilibrium unemployment benefits are higher and, consistently, so are the level of 
employment in sector x, aggregate real income, and welfare (see Table A3 for a numerical 
comparison).  This is because at lower values of λ, stronger aggregate scale economies imply 
that the expansionary effects of welfare state expenditure generate larger efficiency gains 
which, under free-trade, result in greater international pecuniary externalities.  
  
3.2.   Effects of capital mobility  
With capital mobility, the stock of capital available to a country can exceed or fall short of its 
endowment K  as capital can now flow in or out of the country.  We use the source principle 
as the tax rule, so that the income generated by an inflow of capital is taxed before it is 
repatriated.  We also assume that the capital flow between the two countries responds to 
differences in the net of tax return on this factor. The modified equations of the model are 
given in Table A2 in the Appendix.    
 A comparison of the Home country’s aggregate welfare function under no capital 
mobility with that derived under capital mobility is illustrated in Figure 3 which plots, for a 
given b*, the Home country’s welfare function against its unemployment benefit rate b.  It is 
clear that capital mobility leads to a shift in the Home welfare function such that, for any 
given b*, a higher optimal value of b is obtained which also corresponds to a higher level of 
aggregate welfare.       
 The basic intuition behind this result is that a unilateral increase in the generosity of 
unemployment protection in the Home country results, through the virtuous circle outlined 
above, in a lower tax rate. The latter leads to an incipient inflow of capital, thus generating a 
unilateral incentive for the Home government to raise b beyond the case without capital 
mobility.  In the (b, b*) space, this implies an outward (upward) shift of the Home (Foreign) 
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reaction function.  As a result, compared to the case without capital mobility, the Nash non-
cooperative solution under capital mobility entails higher (but identical, given the symmetry 
between countries) unemployment benefit rates.  Given the virtuous circle triggered by the 
policy, it is not surprising that capital mobility also implies a higher level of employment and 
aggregate welfare − as can be seen from the numerical comparisons provided in Table A3 in 
the Appendix.  Again, as in the previous cases, the virtuous circle of entry, higher efficiency 
and higher aggregate employment and income triggered by the policy is more enhanced the 
stronger are vertical linkages and aggregate scale economies. 
 
Figure 3. Non-Cooperative Nash Equilibrium in the Two-Country Case (1) 
The shift in welfare function and optimal b due to capital mobility 
 
(1)  Parameter values used in the numerical simulation are given in the note to Table A3 in the 
Appendix. We have used *b =11.  Note that the above graph is based on the K>0 case (i.e. capital 
flows from country F to country H).  To enable comparison, U is scaled as in Figure 1 – see note 
(2) therein.  
 
 In sum, the welfare policy creates a positive externality even in the presence of capital 
mobility.  Note that although governments’ choice variables are not the capital tax rates, this 
can be thought of as a ‘fiscal’ competition case (defined as non-cooperative policy setting by 
independent governments), to the extent that each government’s policy (optimal choice of 
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unemployment benefits financed by adjusting the capital tax rates) influences the allocation 
of mobile capital amongst different jurisdictions13. These results then clearly suggest that 
capital mobility does not hinder the sustainability of welfare states and that a race-to-the-
bottom in social standards does not necessarily emerge as a result of the competition between 
countries for internationally mobile factors of production14.  In fact, whilst due to the 
symmetric nature of the model the Nash equilibrium is characterised by the same inter-
country distribution of the mobile factor as before barriers to capital mobility were removed, 
both countries are in all respects better off as a result of allowing for capital mobility in spite, 
and indeed because of, a higher unemployment benefit entitlement15 (see Table A3 for a 
numerical comparison of the two cases).   
 
3.3.   The cooperative solution  
Finally, we analyse the cooperative equilibrium solution.  The latter is obtained when the two 
governments agree to set t=t* and b=b* at the outset and choose the latter to maximise their 
joint welfare function subject to the relevant constraints determining the endogenous 
variables in terms of b.  Note that, given the symmetry between countries, the cooperative 
equilibrium is not affected by capital mobility.   
 Figure 4 plots the joint welfare function against the common unemployment benefit 
rate.  It is clear from this figure and the numerical results provided in Table A3 in the 
Appendix that the cooperative solution entails a higher optimal unemployment benefit rate 
than the Nash equilibrium both without and with capital mobility.  The reason for this is that 
in the non-cooperative regimes each government does not take account of the fact that a rise 
in its own unemployment benefit rate will be matched by a rise in the other government’s 
rate. In other words, in the non-cooperative case each government fails to internalise that the 
positive externality of the policy implies that after a raise in b (b*) the optimal response for 
the government of F (H) is to raise b* (b). Cooperation gets round this omission.  It is worth 
noting again that, as in all cases considered before, the optimal policy implies a higher b (and 
a higher employment and welfare) the stronger are the vertical linkages between sectors.  
 
 
                                                 
13   This definition of tax competition is taken from Wilson and Wildasin (2004).  
14   Recall that the reduction in tax rates in this context results from an expansion of the tax base due to a rise in 
employment and real returns to the factors and not from a desire to attract capital as in the tax competition 
case. 
15   Note that, despite the higher b, the total unemployment benefit bill falls as a result of capital mobility.  This 
is due to the much higher level of employment compared to the non-capital mobility case.  
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Figure 4. Cooperative Equilibrium in the Two-Country Case (1) 
 
 
 
(1)  Parameter values used in the numerical simulation are given in the note to Table A3 
in the Appendix. To enable comparison, U is scaled as in Figure 1 – see note (2) 
therein.  
  
 The main results in Table A3 in the Appendix may be summarised as follows: 
A NT NK Cb b b b< < < ; A NT NK Ct t t t> > > ; A NT NK C< < <? ? ? ? ; and A NT NK CU U U U< < < , 
where the superscripts A, NT, NK, and C denote the solutions respectively obtained under 
autarkic, Nash with free-trade only, Nash with free-trade and capital mobility, and full 
cooperation.  These results stem from the positive international spillover effects of the policy 
which imply that: (i) in comparison to the autarkic regime, both the free-trade and the capital 
mobility regimes entail a higher optimal unemployment benefit payment; and (ii) when 
deciding on their level of unemployment benefit independently (or non-cooperatively), 
governments underestimate the extent of the positive policy spillovers, thus setting them 
below the level that would be optimal from a global welfare point of view.  
 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
The conventional wisdom holds that economic globalisation, defined by free-trade and capital 
mobility, reduces governments’ ability to effectively finance social policies and that a 
shrinking tax base and competition for internationally mobile capital could in fact lead to a 
race-to-the-bottom in social standards.   
( ) *( )U b U b+  
Jointly Determined Unemployment Benefit, b
Joint W
elfare  
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 In this paper we develop a theoretical two-sector-two-country model with aggregate 
scale economies and unionisation and find that (i) optimal welfare policy entails a positive 
level of unemployment benefit provision which is higher the higher is the degree of 
international economic integration (i.e., as we move from autarky to free-trade and to capital 
mobility) even when each government acts independently (non-cooperatively) in determining 
its optimal welfare payment; and (ii) optimal cooperative governments’ behaviour entails  a 
higher level of benefit entitlement and a higher aggregate welfare.  
 Hence, this model provides a clear example of circumstances in which welfare states 
and increasing degrees of economic integration are perfectly compatible.  Contrary to the 
conventional wisdom, international trade and capital mobility need not lead to a reduction in 
the revenue raising capacity of governments and to a race-to-the-bottom in social standards.  
International openness can instead complement social insurance policies in increasing 
welfare, thus facilitating the provision of a more generous welfare protection. Our analysis 
does not counter the importance of institutional factors, as proposed by political scientists, in 
explaining the compatibility between welfare states and economic openness16, but suggests 
that these factors may not be necessary for reconciling the provision of social insurance with 
the pressures stemming from economic openness.    
 At the core of our results lies the imperfectly competitive nature of markets and the 
well-known principle that in a second-best world economic policy can be welfare improving.  
In the labour market, unionisation implies that wages are positively related to unemployment 
benefit and income tax rates.  In the goods market, monopolistic competition leads to a 
suboptimal production of varieties and to the emergence of pecuniary externalities stemming 
from the links between upstream producers and their customers – i.e., the downstream 
industry and final consumers. Effectively, government policy contributes to the extraction of 
the rents associated with these pecuniary externalities, thus alleviating the sub-optimal 
provision of varieties in a fashion that reinforces and is reinforced by the standard gains from 
international openness.   
                                                 
16   Political scientists argue that the extent to which economic (and political) pressures stemming from 
globalisation are translated into welfare state retrenchment will typically depend on country-specific political 
and institutional factors and envisage conditions in which a retrenchment of welfare state may not result (e.g., 
Garrett, 1998; Swank, 2002).  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1.  Equations of the two-country model without capital mobility (1)  
(a1)  Sector x price index ( ) *1 11**1 xxxxxx PpNpNP =+= −−− σσσ  
(a2)  Sector y price index ( ) 1; **111**1 ===+= −−− yyyyyyyy PPPpNpNP δδδ , Y used as numeraire 
(a3)   y mark up 
1y x
p Pλδδ
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠ ,  and  
*
1y x
p Pλδδ
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠  
(a4)  y supply ( 1)
x
ry
P
φ δλ
⎛ ⎞= − ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
,  and  
*
* ( 1)
x
ry
P
φ δλ
⎛ ⎞= − ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
(a5)  y demand  ( ) δδ −−+= yyyy pPEEy 1* ,    and   ( ) δδ −−+= yyyy pPEEy 1***  
(a6)  Definition of Ey MEy )1( µ−= ,   and   ** )1( MEy µ−=  
(a7)  x mark up (2) wpx = ,  and  ** wpx =  
(a8)  x supply (2) σβ=x ,   and   σβ=*x  
(a9)  x demand  ( ) σσ −−+= xxxx pPEEx 1* ,    and   ( ) σσ −−+= *1** xxx pPEExx  
(a10)  Definition of Ex x y xE M N P yµ λ= + ,  and  * * *x y xE M N P yµ λ= +  
(a11)  Capital Market 
Restriction KN y =φ , and  KN y =*φ  
(a12)  Demand for Labour (2) xNL σβ= ,  and  ** xNL σβ=  
(a13)  Wage Set by Unions  ( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−−−
=
1
111 σt
b
P
w
,     and    ( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −−−
=
1
111 *
*
*
*
σt
b
P
w
 
(a14)  Consumer Price Index µµ −= 1yx PPP ,  and  µµ −= 1*** yx PPP  
(a15)  Government Budget 
Constraint 
( )
( )
t wL rK
b L L
P
+− = ,   and   ( )* * * ** * *( ) t w L r Kb L L P
+− =  
(a16)  Components of Income ( ) )()1( LLPbKrwLtM −++−= ,  and ( ) )()1( ******** LLbPKrLwtM −++−=  
(a17)  x  Market Clearing 
Condition 
**** xpNxpNEE xxxxxx +=+  
(a18)  y  Market Clearing 
Condition 
**** ypNypNEE yyyyyy +=+  
(a19)  Balance of Payments ( ) ( ) 0=−+− xxxyyy ExpNEypN , and ( ) ( ) 0******** =−+− xxxyyy ExpNEypN  
(1)  Foreign country’s variables are denoted by an asterisk superscript. Note that not all the equations are needed for solving 
the model: (a17) can be obtained from (a1) and (a9);  (a18)  can be obtained from (a2) and (a5); and (a19)  can be 
obtained from (a3), (a4), (a6), (a7), (a8), (a10), (a11), (a12) and (a16).   
 (2)  Recall that in these equations we have imposed the normalisation  ( )1 /α σ σ= − , where α is the inverse of labour 
productivity. 
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Table A2.  Modifications to allow for capital mobility in the two-country model (1)   
(11′)  Capital Market 
Restriction KKN y +=φ ,   and    KKN y −=*φ  
(15′)  Government Budget 
Constraint 
( )( )
( )
t wL r K K
b L L
P
+ +− = ,  and  ( )* * * ** * * ( )( ) t w L r K Kb L L P
+ −− =  
(16′)  Components of 
Income 
( ) )()1( LLPbKrwLtM −++−= ,   and      ( )
)()1(
)()1(
***
*****
LLbPrKt
KKrLwtM
−+−+
−+−=  
(19′)  Balance of Payments ( ) ( ) (1 ) 0y y Y x x xN p y E N p x E t rK− + − − − = , and ( ) ( ) 0)1(******** =−+−+− rKtExpNEypN xxxyyy  
 (1)   Note that capital flow is denoted by K, with K>0 when the flow is from country F to country H.  In the above, income 
equations are based on the convention that the Home country is the net importer of capital, i.e. K>0.  When  K<0, these 
are given by  ( ) KrtLLPbKKrwLtM ** )1()()()1( −−−+++−=  and ( ) )()1( ******** LLbPKrLwtM −++−= .  In 
principle, the capital flow between country F and country H is determined by the relative net returns, e.g. 
( )* *(1 ) (1 )K t r t rκ = − − − , where K>0 when the flow is from F to H and (0, )κ ∈ ∞  determines the degree of 
substitution, 0κ →  and κ → ∞  reflecting the extreme cases of zero and perfect substitution. However, given that in 
this model ,K K K⎡ ⎤∈ − +⎣ ⎦ , we have normalised the capital flow equation as ( ) ( )( ) ( )
* *
* *
1 1
1 1
t r t rK
K t r t r
− − −= − + −
 in order to remain 
consistent with the capital market restriction. Clearly,  K=0 when * *(1 ) (1 )t r t r− = −  while the extreme cases of very 
large tax rate in F or H, i.e. */ 0t t →  or * / 0t t → , leads to  K K→  or K K→ − . 
 
 
 
Table A3. Comparing Solutions for Different Symmetric Equilibria (1)   
 
Autarky 
Equilibrium 
 
Two-Country 
Nash Non-cooperative
Equilibrium 
(no capital mobility) 
Two-Country 
Nash Non-cooperative 
Equilibrium 
(capital mobility) 
Two-Country 
Cooperative 
Equilibrium 
 
λ 1 0.95 1 0.95 1 0.95 1 0.95 
Optimal b 10.6800 11.0900 12.9865 13.4855 12.9886 13.4875 13.0800 13.8100 
t 0.1111 0.1099 0.1090 0.1077 0.1089 0.1076 0.1040 0.1027 
/L L=?  0.8562 0.8577 0.8588 0.8604 0.8590 0.8605 0.8652 0.8667 
/w P  15.0186 15.5733 18.2187 18.8917 18.2193 18.8923 18.2456 18.9191 
/r P  0.0968 0.1005 0.1178 0.1223 0.1178 0.1224 0.1188 0.1234 
( / ) /M P L  13.826 14.363 16.824 17.478 16.827 17.481 16.974 17.631 
( ) /b L L L−  1.536 1.578 1.834 1.883 1.832 1.881 1.763 1.810 
/U L  24.082 24.588 27.027 27.647 27.027 27.648 27.038 27.651 
 (1)   Parameter values used are 10 3 10.3, 5, 10, 6, 10 , 10 , 10K K L Kµ η δ σ β φ− − −= = = = = = = .  Optimal b refers 
to the welfare maximising value of benefit payment.  These results are robust to plausible changes in 
parameter values.  All analytical solutions and calibrations are done in Maple and the work files are 
available on request from the authors.  
